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The Moral Problem of 
Artificial Insemination 
Msgr. Carlo Caffarra 
Monsignor Caffarra is the director of the John Paul II Institute/or 
Studies on Marriage and the Family at the Pontifical Lateran Unil'er.l'itr. 
Original/r fJuhlish ed in Scienza E Origine Della Vita, thefcll/o\\'ing article 
was translated and edited hI' ReI'. Edward J. Barer. S. T. D. 
If one wants to deal with the casuistry of artificial insemination (AI). it is 
necessary to bring forth certain theological and anthropological 
presuppositions on the basis of which individual instances of AI are 
judged. 
Section I: Theological and Anthropological Presuppositions. 
I. The fundamental starting point consists of certain foundational 
affirmations regarding the origin of the human person. 
1.1 The mystery of the origin of every human person has its roots in 
the very mystery of God. The origin of a human person. as a matter 
of fact. is not some kind of chance biological happening. but is the 
result of a creative act. that is. a deliberate and free choice on the 
part of God to do so mething He is no way obliged to do. Every 
human person is known and willed by God I) in a totally special. 
individual way. different from the way in which God knows and 
wills any other person. and 2) for his or her own sake. Called into 
existence as "thou." the human perso n is able in turn to respond to 
this call to exist. The human person is made in God's "image and 
likeness". 
If. from the theological point of view. the final explanation for 
the conceiving of a new human person is the decision of God 
Himself to creale. then the sexual joining ofa man and a woman is 
shown. in this context. with its most profound meaning. In a very 
real way a man and a woman share in the creative act of God. They 
themselves are an image of His creative love. 
What does this sharing in God's creation ofa new human person 
mean and contain within itself? God's act of creating a new person 
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is not an act necessitated by the intrinsic nature of God. In other 
words, God does not create because He has no choice and cannot 
do otherwise. The act of creat ion is, to the contrary, the fruit of a 
love which in God is therefore free and gratuitous in a sovereign 
way, unique to Him. Also , therefore, the human act o f procreation 
(that is, a man a nd a woman's sharing in God's act of creating a 
human perso n) , must proceed from thi s same kind of source: a n 
act of love. Morally, therefore, if this act of procreation by two 
human beings is to come out of an act of love - if. in ot her words , 
this act of procreation is to be what it is called to be - it is not 
enough sim ply that what man and woman do to bring forth a new 
life be freely willed and reasoned o ut in a deliberate decision. If we 
see procreation as requiring only that a couple has thought about it 
and decided on it, then the act of the couple in procreating wo uld 
consist simply in activati ng their own generative capacities, as 
their reasoning powers indicate, in order to reach a particular goa l, 
namely, the generat ing of a child, a human person. 
This way of using the generat ive powers would substant ia lly set 
up a purely instrumentalist relationship between, o n the one hand , 
their spiritual power of./i·ee choi('e a nd , on the other hand , their 
sexualit.l' in its biological as pect. (The couple would merely utilize 
one another's biological sex uality, turning it int o a mere 
instrument which the co uple sees will achieve a particular goa l- a 
co nception. This goal, then , is what alone would give their 
sex ua lity its ethical value - make it huma nly wort hwhil e. Sexual 
union between them, as the ex pression which belongs uniquely to 
the two of them for reite rating their love-commitment , legitimately 
might or might not be the object of their fj'ee choice. The moral 
ap propriateness of their decision to use or ·not to use sex ua l union 
would depend entirely on what hope this sexual union offers for 
achieving a des ired goal - conception. The free a nd informed 
decision to have a child would thus not be connected by any moral 
necessitl' to the gen ital ex pression of the conjugal bond of love. 
Thus the conjugal act would become only one option among 
others for generating new life.) Such a relati onship betwee n the 
couple 's internal freedom and the biological aspect of their 
sexualitl , leaves these two aspects of their huma nity entirely 
extraneous to one a nother, split asunder. 
The very being of a man and woman called to co-create, with 
God, a human person, requires so mething deeper tha n this. It 
requires that the internal aspect oftheir life , i.e., their spiritual life, 
on the one hand , and their generative capacity on the other be 
profound~v united, a nd that the internal life they have as free 
spirits should be lived out in their generative capacity in an 
inseparable way. This profound unification of the spiritual and the 
corporeal and their unbreakable indwelling and interpenetration 
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work themselves out only in an act of love for in reality, love in 
human beings is not merely a spiritual act, but is a physical act. 
And conjugal love is expressed and made a reality in and through 
the physical aspect of sexuality in such a way that this physical 
aspect of sexuality becomes fully human only when it is a sign of 
genuine conjugal love, and not otherwise. 
From this reflection on the relationship between creation on the part 
of God and co-creation on the part of human parents, we come to a 
conclusion of great importance for the problem we are discussing -
artificial insemination. On the one hand , the requirements of a 
procreation which is truly human show the most profound truth of all 
about sexual union - that it is so constituted as to be open to new life. 
On the other hand , these very same requirements for a procreation 
which is truly human show the necessity , from an ethical point of view, 
that the human person should arise only from this selfsame sexual 
union , that is , from the love unique to husband and wife and uniquely 
expressed in the conjugal act. 
Because the love-bond between husband and wife spontaneously 
appears to be and, as a matter of fact, is the ultimate source of the new 
human person, and also because the man and woman are co-creators 
with God, it is not enough that this love between husband and wife 
simply sets in motion the process which can possibly lead to 
conception, as though the love-bond between them were some power 
distinctfrom and outside the procreative power God has given to us as 
embodied persons. It is ethically necessary that the very action which 
initiates this process leading to conception be, in all of its reality, 
human - human in the sense of both physical and spiritual- a love 
which unites "two persons in one flesh". The action required, then, 
cannot be reduced simply to making available, outside the uniquely 
conjugal love-act, gametes which will then be united with one another. 
1.2 This reflection on the origin of the human person, an origin seen 
as a wondrous and mysterious working together between the 
creative power of God and the co-creative capacity of a man and 
woman, leads us to examine more accurately and to elaborate 
upon with greater effort, certain subjects which keep coming up in 
our culture today. 
Human sexuality is not an "object", a mere "thing" which the 
human being simply "utilizes", even if he does so in a "responsible" 
way. Instead human sexuality is actually a constitutive part of the 
human person. In a certain real sense, sexuality is the human 
person, for in the final analysis, the human person is not a being 
who has a body, but a being who is a body. The obscuring of this 
vision which sees the human being as a unity of body and spirit 
constitutes one of the most serious defects of our contemporary 
culture. 
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What follows then from this unitary vision of the human 
person? This, for one thing: that the person does not have any 
ultimate power over his sexuality for the simple reason that he 
does not have any such power over himself True, man is 
responsible for himself, but that does not mean he has ultimate 
power over himself. In other words, any dominion which a person 
has over himself or herself or over his or her own sexuality is not to 
be thought of primarily in terms of utilization (making use of one's 
self), but in terms of ethics (respect for one's self) . 
"Responsible for one's sexuality." But what does this expression 
mean, then? It means that the human person is not the "lord and 
master" of that sexuality having the ius utendi (the right to use) et 
abutendi (the right to destroy), but that one's sexuality is a gift-
and-duty. The person accepts this gift-and-duty only insofar as he 
absorbs totally the meanings of his or her sexuality, without 
excluding anyone of these meanings . When this does not happen, 
- when the person excludes one of these meanings - that person 
is actually ind ulging in a mere whim which offers the human being 
the instruments for exercising power. This destruction of one's 
own dignity takes place even though one is under the impression 
that one is exercising a rational dominion over his or her self. 
In Western culture today, this issue of the power human beings 
have has become intimately bound up with the issue of the science 
we have - science which offers the human being instruments for 
exercising power. Now, precisely this correlation between power 
and the instruments offered by science to exercise power must be 
thought out in the context of the preceding reflections of this 
article. For science must be seen as a help for the human person in 
exercising responsibility, not mere power, over his or her own self. 
The purpose of science is to enable human persons to live in the 
fullness of the truth about themselves - to be authentically 
human. The use of science, therefore, and its applications in the 
areas of the human person, have limits which do not admit of 
transgression. These limits are constituted by the dignity of the 
human being as a spiritual-corporeal acting person, (a "subject"), 
called by God to participate in His creative act by the exercise (in a 
fully spiritual and corporeal way) of the human person's sexuality 
in marriage. The duty of science is to help the human person 
achieve this calling, not to create a substitute for the person. In 
other words , the role of science is to help the person achieve that 
joining of the procreative potency of a man and woman with the 
creative power of God . 
2. The Casuistry of AI 
In light of this principle we have now formulated, we can go on to the 
analysis of various types of AI. 
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2.1 Artificial insemirration from a donor (AID) ethically must be 
rejected. The procreative sharing of married persons in the creative 
act of God takes place through their setting in motion their genital 
powers . The origin of each and every newly conceived person 
implies two levels of reality . I nsofar as this human person belongs 
to the world of earthly life (human material level), his or her origin 
implies a whole series of hialagical events, as the human 
reprod uct ive sciences ma ke more and more clear each day. Insofar 
as the human person belongs to the world of spirit life (human 
rati o nal leve l) . the origin ofa new human person demands that this 
person begin with aFee decisiol1la lal'e, because only in this way is 
the human person willed into existence by human beings in the 
mod e which his or her dignity requires: namely . for his or her 0H'11 
sake. 
There is a separalioll of this twofold level of events when the 
indi vid ual( s) whose freely chosen act establishes the prerequisites 
and beginning of the biological process is ane person. a nd the 
indi vidual( s} who. as a free sp iritua l being. made the decision that 
there should be a new life. is anolher person. This separation 
between the two levels of events (those of material life and those of 
spirit life). inevitable as it is because di st inct persons are acting at 
each leveL makes impossible a sharing. hUlllan in Ihe/iill sense, in 
the creative act of God. For one who is the parent biologically is 
not the parent s piritually. and the one who is the parent spiritually 
is not the parent biologically . This divorce between the biological 
and the spiritual is a contradiction to the nature of the human 
person. who is a IIllit\' of spir it and matter. for the biological is 
truly a constitutive element of the human perso n. 
2.2. Since th e birth of Louise Brown in July . 1978. the problem has 
become more profound with the actual achievement of an in vitro 
fertili za tion using the husband's semen (IYF) . 
From the ethical point of view. in vitro fertilization separates 
comp letely the event which gives rise to a new human life from the 
sexual conjoining of the two spouses. This fact. therefore. makes 
necessary a further deepening of the preceding reflections. The 
human person is a n essentially hisrorical realit y: his life as an event 
is deve loped in lillie. At the outset of this individual's history - the 
history. that is. of each one of us - there is an originating and 
founding event which does not belong simply to the past. but is a 
kind of fountain from which issues forth the whole flow of one's 
existence. This founding event is. of course. one's conception. In 
this event are included a ll the other sources of one's human life. 
Now. in in vitro fertilization. this event is brought about. not by 
the husband and wife in their physical-spiritual giving of 
themselves to one another. but by a scient ist in his laboratory. 
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Some might object immediately that the two gametes are 
provided by the spouses, and that the intervention of science is 
limited to joining these two gametes, with implantation following , 
But this objection reveals once again the poverty of its underlying 
anthropology, for it in reality presupposes that the conception of a 
human person is an event in which the biological act can rightly be 
withdrawn from the spiritual act. 
Therefore, it does not seem to me that, from an ethical point of 
view, we can approve in vitro fertilization. At the very least , any 
opinion favoring it seems to me to be full of traps. 
I n the light of what we have been saying up to this point, we are 
in a position now to formulate the overall ethical principle which, 
in our thinking, must govern our response to various types of AI. 
The principle is: Since the origin of the human person consists , by 
its very essence, of an interrelationship between the creative power 
of God and the procreative capacity of the human person (with all 
that this interrelationship involves), I) scient!fic technique cannot 
ethically be a substitute for this co-creative sharing of the human 
person in the creative act of God , but, 2) when necessary, science 
can legitimately oller help to make possible this co-creative 
sharing. 
2.3. Let us look then at the problem of AIH. From all that we have 
said to this point, we can formulate the following principle: AI H 
can be considered licit , I) when "a true and proper conjugal act" 
takes place between the two spouses, and 2) when, at the same 
time, it is necessary to get scientific help to make this conjugal act, 
carried out in the normal way, effective (that is productive of a 
pregnancy) because, without some scientific intervention, it would 
most certainly remain infertile. 
What is ethically essential, then, is that between the two spouses 
there be a true and proper conjugal act. This has already been 
demonstrated in the first part of this presentat ion. By "a true and 
proper conjugal act" should be understood "the activation of that 
capacity for sexual activity without which capacity, according to 
the theological and canonical doctrine of the Church, one would 
be up against the impediment o/impotencr". 
From the ethical point of view, once this act has been posited, 
nothing else is required olthe two spouses. Any subsequent 
recourse they may have to some artificial intervention amounts, 
therefore, to giving assistance to the procreative act which, insofar 
as it is a human act, has already in itsellbeen completed. 
Any problems involved in applying this princ iple are not of a 
theological. but rather of a practical order. In practice, it can be 
indeed difficult to discern whether a given man-made intervention 
illicitly substitutes for or, to the contrary, licitly assists the conjugal 
act. When we reach this point, the juncture where some concrete 
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procedure must be judged ethically (and excluding altogether as 
morally illicit any posthumous fertilization or a fertili zation by a 
husband who is phys ically distant), what is needed is the combined 
reflection of both ethics and science. 
Conclusion 
The sexual-conjugal act is simply not a purely biological event, for its 
inherent orientation (toward expressing the mutual and 101al giving of the 
persons of the two spouses, and toward procreation), brings this act into 
the area of ethical values, and binds it to these values. The values are two: 
I) the life of a new human person, and 2) the fulfillment of the spouses in 
each other and in any new life God may wish to give through and in the act 
which is uniquely typical of their love. Any reflection on AI must be 
motivated ultimately by one overriding concern: that the human person be 
physically conceived in a way adequate to his dignity, and that human 
sexuality be understood in its entire truth. 
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